Meeting Short -Term Needs of Poor Families Emergency Assistance for Needy Families with Children by Gardella, Lawrence
Cornell Law Review
Volume 60
Issue 5 June 1975 Article 9
Meeting Short -Term Needs of Poor Families
Emergency Assistance for Needy Families with
Children
Lawrence Gardella
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lawrence Gardella, Meeting Short -Term Needs of Poor Families Emergency Assistance for Needy Families with Children, 60 Cornell L. Rev.
879 (1975)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol60/iss5/9
MEETING SHORT-TERM NEEDS OF POOR FAMILIES:
EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES
WITH CHILDREN*
In 1968, Congress amended the Social Security Act' to ensure
that children receive the care which the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) program2 was unable to provide.
Within the framework of AFDC, the amendment created a new
program, Emergency Assistance to Needy Families With Children
(EANFC),4 to provide short-term relief to meet the needs of
children in families faced with emergencies. 5 The program is
* I wish to express my thanks to Lawrence S. Kahn and Martin A. Schwartz of the
Legal Aid Society of Westchester County for their helpful ideas regarding the right to
expedited fair hearings on emergency assistance claims.
Act of Jan. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 206, 81 Stat. 821, 893 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 601-644 (1970)).
2 For a general analysis of the AFDC program, see Lurie, Major Changes in the Structure
of the AFDC Program Since 1935, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 825 (1974). Discussion of current
developments in the AFDC area may be found in Developments in Welfare Law-1973, 59
CORNELL L. REV. 859, 861-80 (1974) and Note, 1974 Developments in Welfare Law-Aid to
Families with Dependent Children, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 857 (1975).
3 The committee's bill is concerned with several major objectives-to assure needed
care for children, to focus maximum effort on self-support by families, and to
provide more flexible and appropriate tools to accomplish these objectives....
The committee understands that the process of determining AFDC eligibility
and authorizing payments frequently precludes the meeting of emergency needs
when a crisis occurs. In the event of eviction, or when utilities are turned off, or
when an alcoholic parent leaves children without food, immediate action is neces-
sary. It is frequently unavailable under State programs today.
S. REP. No. 744, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 165 (1967).
4 42 U.S.C. § 606(e) (1970) provides:
(1) The term "emergency assistance to needy families with children" means any of
the following, furnished for a period not in excess of 30 days in any 12-month
period, in the case of a needy child under the age of 21 who is (or, within such
period as may be specified by the Secretary, has been) living with any of the
relatives specified in subsection (a) (1) of this section in a place of residence
maintained by one or more of such relatives as his or their own home, but only
where such child is without available resources, the payments, care, or services
involved are necessary to avoid destitution of such child or to provide living
arrangements in a home for such child, and such destitution or need for living
arrangements did not arise hecause such child or relative refused without good
cause to accept employment or training for employment-
(A) money payments, payments in kind, or such other payments as
the State agency may specify with respect to, or medical care or any other
type of remedial care authorized under State law on behalf of, such child
or any other member of the household in which he is living, and
(B) such services as may be specified by the Secretary;
but only with respect to a State whose State plan approved under section 602 of this
tide includes provision for such assistance;
(2) Emergency assistance as authorized under paragraph (1) may be provided
under the conditions specified in such paragraph to migrant workers with families
in the State or in such part or parts thereof as the State shall designate.
5 The federal government participates in two other programs designed to provide
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optional and may be incorporated into the state's AFDC plan. 6
States electing to exercise this option are given considerable flexi-
bility in determining how EANFC is to be utilized to meet the
needs of eligible families. Federal funds are available to a state to
reimburse one-half of its expenditures for emergency payments,





Although many of the administrative requirements of EANFC
merely duplicate those of the general AFDC program, 8 others
short-term emergency relief to low-income households: Emergency Assistance to Adults
(EAA), 42 U.S.C. § 1383(a)(4) (Supp. III, 1973), and "disaster relief," 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 5121-5202 (Supp. 1975). EAA is a part of the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program.
It grants temporary assistance to certain people who have applied for SSI benefits and who are
awaiting departmental determination of eligibility. An applicant presumptively eligible for SSI
will be awarded a cash advance up to $100 if he needs the money in order to meet a financial
emergency. An applicant who is presumptively disabled may receive EAA benefits equivalent to
full SSI payments for a period not to exceed three months, pending departmental determina-
tion of his eligihility, if he is found to be otherwise eligible for SSI benefits. Under the EANFC
and EAA programs, states may have a residual responsibility to meet the needs of applicants for
and recipients of SSI assistance. See generally Fuller v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Serv., 77
Misc. 2d 677, 352 N.Y.S.2d 978 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (providing aid generally in instances of
administrative delay within the SSI program); Ingram v. Fahey, 78 Misc. 2d 958,358 N.Y.S.2d
604 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (preventing termination of an SSI recipient's utility service); Note, 1974
Developments in Welfare Law--The Supplemental Security Income Program, 60 COPR'NELL L. REv. 825,
829-33 (1975). Contra, King v. NewJersey Dep't of Institutions & Agencies, 124 N.J. Super. 518,
308 A.2d 32 (App. Div. 1973). See note 43 infra.
Unlike EANFC and EAA, the disaster relief program aids people of every income level.
It also grants assistance to nonprofit educational and utility facilities and to local govern-
ments. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5172 (Supp. 1975). Several provisions do, however, focus on problems
experienced by low-income people in the wake of a natural disaster. For example, 42
U.S.C.A. § 5179 (Supp. 1975) authorizes the President to ensure that low-income house-
holds are issued food stamp coupons and that surplus commodities are made available to
them. Nevertheless, because the program only operates in instances of major area-wide
disasters, it cannot be considered a significant means of granting emergency aid to the poor.
' The District of Columhia and the following states had adopted some form of EANFC
program as of the end of 1972: Alaska, Arkansas, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. SOCIML SECURITY BULLETIN ANNUAL STATISTICAL
SUPPLEMENT 1972, Table 141, at 148 (1974). The Table presents the amount of money
expended by each of these states for emergency assistance and for other forms of public
assistance.
7 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(5) (Supp. III, 1973).
8 Both AFDC and EANFC authorize payments only to homes in which a needy child
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differ significantly from corresponding AFDC requirements. One
basic difference is that EANFC benefits for any eligible household
are limited to one thirty-day period in any twelve-month period, 9
whereas AFDC assistance is available whenever need exists and
certain nonfinancial eligibility criteria remain satisfied. The
rationale for imposing this time limitation on EANFC grants stems
from the concept of "emergency." Evidently, Congress decided
that an emergency situation could always be remedied within thirty
days, and that a family was unlikely to be stricken by bona fide
lives, and only if the child is living with, or has recently lived with, one or more relatives
within specified categories. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a)(1) (1970). Both programs contain substantial
work penalty provisions denying aid to older children refusing to accept work or training for
employment. Although the AFDC work penalty terminates public assistance henefits of only
the family memher who fails to satisfy a work requirement, EANFC provisions deny aid to the
entire family. See note 16 and accompanying text infra. In addition, because EANFC is a part
of AFDC, the general administrative provisions concerning approval of a state AFDC plan
by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare also apply to EANFC. See 42 U.S.C. §§
602(a)(1)-(6), (12), (13), (16), (21)-(24) (Supp. III, 1973).
9 42 U.S.C. § 606(e) (1970); 45 C.F.R. § 233.120(b)(3) (1974). When Congress was
considering the amendments to the Social Security Act that created EANFC, the Senate
amended the original House bill to provide for up to 60 days of emergency assistance in a
12-month period. However, the Senate receded from this amendment, Senate Amendment
207, as part of a compromise to obtain House support for all of the Social Security
Amendments. See H.R. REP. No. 1030, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 60 (1967).
The time limitation is not quite as harsh as it might initially appear. Payments
authorized within the 30-day period can provide for needs that arose before the first day
and for those expenses that extend beyond the thirtieth day. 45 C.F.R. § 233.120(b)(3)
(1974). This regulation specifies neither how soon before the start of the 30 days an
obligation must have been incurred for it to be included in an EANFC grant, nor for how
long after the thirtieth day payments can be authorized. Presumably, no matter how long a
debt has existed, it can be paid by an emergency assistance grant if its nonpayment has
created a current crisis. For instance, emergency aid can be given to pay for back rent of
several months if a tenant family would otherwise be evicted. See, e.g., 18 NYCRR 372.4(a)
(Sept. 30, 1973).
Nevertheless, Oregon has imposed significant restrictions on coverage of back rent and
utility payments. Rent for a dispossessed family's "[b]ack rent and utility bills may be paid for
a period not to exceed one month before the date of application .... OREGON PWD RULES
AND REGULATIONS § 5.625(2) (Transmittal Letter No. 47, May 15, 1974). Because one of the
purposes of the enactment of EANFC was to provide immediate relief to families faced with
eviction or utility termination (see note 3 supra), this state regulation may be invalid. Often a
landlord will not threaten eviction when a tenant is only one month behind on his rent;
therefore, a crisis may not arise until two or mote months of back rent is due. Furthermore, a
tenant might not seek emergency assistance until after his rent is one month overdue. In either
instance, the Oregon regulation specifies that the state will not make those payments which may
be necessary to avoid loss of living arrangements.
Where a particular need is not satisfied by a single EANFC grant, further payments
associated with this need may be made after the end of the period. For example, in Maye v.
Lavine, [1972-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH Pov. L. REp. 18,130 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1973), the
court stated that the 30-day limitation did not preclude the granting of emergency assistance
when a recipient faced destitution because of the theft of EANFC funds which she had been
given to pay a judgment for rent to avoid eviction.
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emergencies more than once a year. Inevitably, some families will
face more than one crisis; nevertheless, EANFC will not provide
them with additional relief.'0
Because of the emergency nature of EANFC situations, the
procedures for granting benefits have been made more efficient
than those for AFDC. Since state plans incorporating EANFC must
"[p]rovide that emergency assistance will be given forthwith,"" a
state's method of providing public assistance payments may be
satisfactory for regular AFDC benefits, yet impermissibly slow for
EANFC grants. 2 Accordingly, in Adens v. Sailer,'3 a federal district
court held that the Philadelphia County Board of Assistance had
violated this federal requirement by utilizing a centralized mailing
system that produced delays of several days before eligible appli-
cants received their emergency assistance checks. The requirement
that emergency aid be provided forthwith has also placed sig-
nificant substantive limitations on a state's freedom to choose a
method of administering emergency assistance. Thus, in Purnell v.
10 The states remain free, of course, to use their own funds to meet the emergency
needs of people who are suffering from their second crisis situation in a 12-month period.
.New Jersey has instituted a system that authorizes state-financed emergency assistance to
qualified families faced with their second or third crisis within a one year period. Such
families may receive emergency benefits if their eligibility is confirmed by a special review
process administered by the county welfare board. See N.J.A.C. 10:82-12.1 1(b)1 (Supp. Aug.
15, 1973).
New York provides aid to a family stricken by a natural disaster even if that family has
received EANFC benefits within the year preceding the application for catastrophe assistance.
See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 131-a(6) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
:1 45 C.F.R. § 233.120(a)(5) (1974) (emphasis added).
12 The only federal time constraint on regular AFDC benefit payments is that applica-
tions be acted upon "with reasonable promptness," 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(4) (Supp. I1, 1973),
and that an eligibility determination be made within 45 days after the filing of the
application. See 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(a)(3)(i) (1974). Clearly, these requirements do not
mandate that aid be granted "forthwith."
13 312 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Pa. 1970). Pennsylvania had a policy of granting emergency
assistance to individuals whose regular public assistance checks did not arrive when due and
to people with emergency needs who were awaiting departmental decision on their applica-
tions for general assistance. However, only after an anticipated check was five days late could
a public assistance recipient apply for EANFC. Even recipients declared eligible for
emergency relief were forced to wait until an emergency check was mailed because
Pennsylvania welfare departments refused to issue these checks on demand. The court,
citing the legislative history as expressed in S. REP. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967),
invalidated the Pennsylvania system, and stated that:
It is dearly the intent of these statutes and regulations that in view of the crisis
nature of the circumstances in which emergency assistance is provided for, such
assistance must be furnished immediately and without any undue delay. We think
that the present system of centralized mailing of emergency checks utilized by the
Department of Public Welfare in Philadelphia is inconsistent with the federal
requirement that emergency checks be given to recipients immediately upon
determination of eligibility.
312 F. Supp. at 927.
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Edelman,'4 the Illinois Department of Public Aid was directed to
change its policy of granting emergency assistance in utility termi-
nation cases only after the utility service had been terminated.
The factors that states must consider in determining which
class of persons to protect differ in the EANFC and AFDC pro-
grams. Most of these variations enable a state to establish an EANFC
plan which encompasses a broader spectrum of low-income
families than is covered by the rest of the AFDC program.'
5
However, one difference causes certain children, qualified to par-
ticipate in AFDC, to be excluded from EANFC benefits; EANFC
denies emergency assistance to children faced with destitution
because of the unjustified refusal of a relative living in the house-
hold to accept employment or training for employment. The
AFDC work penalty merely reduces the size of the total family
grant when a responsible relative refuses to work or to accept
training; it does not deny aid to those in the household who have
not violated a work requirement.'
6
"' 365 F. Supp. 499 (N.D. Ill. 1973),aff'd in part mem., 495 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1974). Prior
to this decision, when a person was faced with the imminent termination of utility service, the
Illinois Department of Public Aid (IDPA) would not grant any benefits to forestall the
termination. Only when service had been discontinued would IDPA grant emergency assistance
to restore the person's utility service. The court held that a "failure to give timely assistance
occurs when the 1DPA permits the utility service to be discontinued, especially when it will
authorize the necessary funds immediately after termination." Id. at 500. See also note 35 infra.
," See notes 18-22 and accompanying text infra. Note, however, that although EANFC
provisions empower a state to extend assistance to people who are ineligible for AFDC, a
state is not required to do so. The District of Columbia limits emergency assistance eligibility
to individuals eligible for regular public assistance. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-209 (1973). A
similar practice was upheld in Baxter v. Minter, 374 F. Supp. 1213 (D.C. Mass. 1974), in
which the court stated that federal law afforded the states the discretion to establish
whatever standards of need they deemed appropriate.
Oregon presents an interesting contrast to the pattern of most states which grant
EANFC coverage to all AFDC recipients and then choose to include other groups as well. If
an Oregon family is "eligible for, or receiving AFDC," it cannot receive emergency assis-
tance. OREGON PWD RULES AND REGULATIONS § 5.610(2)(c) (Transmittal Letter No. 47, May
15, 1974). The Oregon regulations require a family eligible for AFDC to seek benefits from
AFDC rather than from the more efficient EANFC program. The exclusion of families that are
eligible for AFDG but who are not actually receiving such assistance seems to be contrary to the
intent of the Social Security Act, which is concerned with providing benefits more promptly
than can generally be done under AFDG programs. See note 3 supra. See also notes 11-14 and
accompanying text supra.
By categorically excluding all AFDG recipients, Oregon may again be acting contrary to the
intent of the Act. If its house burns down, if its welfare check is stolen, if its food spoils during an
electric blackout, or if it is faced with a similar emergency, a recipient family should also be
eligible for EANFG. However, if Oregon public welfare offices promptly issue extra AFDC
grants to replace stolen checks and additional benefits to provide for needs occasioned by a
disaster, there may be no grounds for attacking the exclusion from coverage. For a discussion of
the related issue of grant duplication, see notes 43, 44, and 51 infra.
16 See the work penalty clause contained in 42 U.S.C. § 606(e) (1970), quoted in note 4
supra, and that contained in AFDC, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(18)(F) (Supp. 1i, 1973).
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In general, the administrative provisions of EANFC pertaining
to determination of classes of eligible individuals reflect a congres-
sional intent to allow a state to meet the emergency household
needs of a broader population than those eligible for AFDC. 17 For
example, Congress expanded the AFDC definition of "child" for
EANFC purposes to include every person between the ages of
eighteen and twenty-one, rather than only those who were attend-
ing some educational or training program. More significantly, the
EANFC statute and regulations do not include the AFDC require-
ment that a needy child be "deprived of parental support or
care."'18 Any needy child living with one or more of the relatives
specified in the AFDC chapter of the Social Security Act may
receive assistance.' 9 Thus, a child may be eligible if he lives with his
natural parents, even if they are healthy and working.20 Moreover,
if a needy child is not living with one of the specified relatives, he is
eligible for EANFC if he has lived with such a relative within the
six months prior to making application for emergency assistance.2'
A state may specify standards of financial eligibility for
EANFC more liberal than those for other portions of its AFDC
plan.22 A state which establishes a liberal test may even obtain
federal reimbursement for assistance granted to a family earning
in excess of general AFDC guidelines. Apparently, Congress rec-
ognized that many people just above the "poverty line" were also
unable to weather crises and therefore encouraged the states to
17 See notes 1-3 and accompanying text supra.
18 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970).
When used in this part-
(a) The term "dependent child" means a needy child (1) who has been deprived of
parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home,
or physical or mental incapacity of a parent, and who is living with his father,
mother, grandfather, grandmother, brother, sister, stepfather, stepmother, step-
brother, stepsister, uncle, aunt, first cousin, nephew, or niece, in a place of
residence maintained by one or more of such relatives as his or their own home,
and (2) who is (A) under the age of eighteen, or (B) under the age of twenty-one
and (as determined by the State in accordance with standards prescribed by the
Secretary) a student regularly attending a school, college, or university, or regularly




20 Because there is no express ceiling on either the size of an individual EANFC grant
or the total amount of state expenditures subject to federal reimbursement, the option to
include families ineligible for AFDC has been abused by some state welfare departments.
For example, in New York, a social services department may give up to three months of
EANFC benefits to certain people found eligible for home relief before the department
transfers them to the wholly state-funded general assistance program. See New York
Department of Social Services Administrative Letter, 72 P.W.D-20 (Feb. 24, 1972).
21 45 C.F.R. § 233.120(b)(1) (1974).
22 Id. § 233.120(a)(1).
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provide them with financial assistance. In addition to providing the
discretion to specify eligibility criteria, EANFC authorizes a state to
determine the particular emergency needs its program will meet,23
the services which will be offered to meet those needs, 24 and the
methods which will be employed to provide the necessary money,
services, and care.25 It is clear that federal administrative provi-
sions allow a state far more freedom in operating its EANFC
program than its AFDC program. However, the freedom given to
the states may be limited by the purposes of the EANFC sections of
the Social Security Act and by the structure within which the state
must formulate the EANFC portion of its AFDC plan.
26
II
EMERGENCY NEEDS FOR WHICH EANFC Is AVAILABLE
When a child is without resources, a state may give his family
EANFC to provide living arrangements for the child or to prevent
deprivation of any necessity. Assistance may be granted for such
needs as shelter, moving expenses, furniture, household ap-
pliances, utility service, food, clothing, medical care, child care, and
transportation expenses. State EANFC programs provide for a vari-
ety of these needs,27 but many states do not attempt to meet a
recognized need in all emergency situations.
23 The state AFDC plan must "[s]pecify the emergency needs that will he met, whether
mass feeding or dothing distribution are included, and the methods of providing payments,
medical care, and other remedial care." Id. § 233.120(a)(3).
24 The state AFDG plan must "[s]pecify which of the following services will be provided:
Information, referral, counseling, securing family shelter, child care, legal services, and any
other services that meet needs attributable to the emergency or unusual crisis situations." Id.
§ 233.120(a)(4).
25 Id. § 233.120(a)(1)(3). Note that AFDC authorizes only money grants, except in certain
specified situations. See note 51 infra.
26 See notes 28-38 and 41-49 and accompanying text infra.
27 For example, New Jersey authorizes provision of shelter, food, dothing, and house-
hold furnishings. N.J.A.C. 10.82-12.1 1(c) (Supp. Aug. 15, 1973). By implication the state
plan has been held to authorize emergency assistance to avoid the loss of utility service. Boyd
v. Department of Institutions & Agencies, 126 N.J. Super. 273, 314 A.2d 79 (App. Div.),
cert. denied, 65 N.J. 281, 321 A.2d 242 (1974); King v. New Jersey Dep't of Institutions &
Agencies, 124 N.J. Super. 518, 308 A.2d 32 (App. Div. 1973). Rhode Island gives assistance
for natural disasters. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 40-6-9 (Supp. 1974). New York provides aid for
"food, clothing, household supplies and equipment, utilities, transportation, shelter (includ-
ing cost of repairs to recipient-owned homes), moving expenses, and other emergency
needs. 18 NYCRR 372.4(a) (Sept. 30, 1973). By authorizing their welfare department to
replace with EANFG checks regular public assistance checks that have been lost or stolen,
other states provide for resulting emergency needs. See Baxter v. Minter, 378 F. Supp. 1213
(D.C. Mass. 1974), discussed in note 15 supra; Adens v. Sailer, 312 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Pa.
1970), discussed in note 13 and accompanying text supra.
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The authority of a state to restrict the availability of emergency
assistance is not without limitations. Although states are generally
afforded more discretion under EANFC than under AFDC, eligi-
bility criteria must comport with the express provisions and the
legislative intent of the Social Security Act. If state EANFC regula-
tions create eligibility conditions that are not authorized by the
Social Security Act, the regulations may be void under the suprem-
acy clause of the Constitution. The Supreme Court in King v.
Smith 28 established the principle that states may not deny AFDC to
28 392 U.S. 309 (1968). The Supreme Court has held that a state does not have the
power to impose AFDC eligibility standards, other than those found in the federal statute
and regulations, when the result of such criteria is the exclusion from coverage of families
otherwise eligible for AFDC. In Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971), the Court stated:
King v. Smith establishes that, at least in the absence of congressional authorization
for the exclusion dearly evidenced from the Social Security Act or its legislative
history, a state eligibility standard that excludes persons eligible for assistance under
federal AFDC standards violates the Social Security Act and is therefore invalid
under the Supremacy Clause.
Id. at 286. See also Developments in Welfare Law-1973, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 859, 864-65,
868-75 (1974).
Relying on Townsend and on Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972), the Supreme
Court recently reiterated this position in Lascaris v. Shirley, 95 S. Ct. 1190 (1975). The
Court affirmed a 3-judge district court decision that New York State could not condition
AFDC eligibility on a recipient's cooperation in a paternity or support action absent
authorization in the Social Security Act for the imposition of such a requirement. Shirley v.
Lavine, 365 F. Supp. 818 (N.D.N.Y. 1973). Since Congress had subsequently amended the Act
to allow a state the option of requiring this type of cooperation, the Supreme Court's holding
had retroactive effect only. See Note, 1974 Developments in Welfare Law-Aid to Families With
Dependent Children, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 857, 871-75 (1975).
In New York Department of Social Services v. Dubino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973), the Supreme
Court upheld New York regulations which effectively added an AFDC eligibility criterion not
expressly provided for in the Social Security Act. However, the Court had no difficulty
distinguishing Townsend, Carleson, and King.
In those cases it was clear that state law excluded people from AFDC benefits who the
Social Security Act expressly provided would be eligible. The Court found no room
either in the Act's language or legislative history to warrant the States' additional
eligibility requirements. Here, by contrast, the Act allows for complementary state
work incentive programs and procedures incident thereto-even if they become
conditions for continued assistance.
Id. at 421-22. Although the federal act did not explicitly permit the work requirements imposed
by New York, it manifested a clear federal policy to condition receipt of AFDC benefits on a
person's making efforts to secure employment. Hence, the New York regulation was in line with
the legislative history of the Social Security Act.
The standards by which to test the validity of a state regulation excluding a group of people
from AFDC have not been changed by Burns v. Alcala, 95 S. Ct. 1180 (1975). See note 46 infra.
See also Note, 1974 Developments in Welfare Law--Aid to Families With Dependent Children, 60
CORNELL L. REv. 857, 865-70 (1975). In Burns, the Supreme Court rejected the idea that a
presumption of coverage should be applied in determining whether any particular group of
people can be excluded from participation in a state's AFDC program. The Court stated instead
that regular rules of statutory construction should apply. In King, Townsend, and Carleson, the
Court had used normal methods of statutory interpretation, presuming coverage only when a
group would be eligible under a straightforward reading of the Social Security Act.
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individuals who are eligible under federal standards, absent au-
thorization in the Social Security Act. In holding that federal
participation is available only when a state does not exclude per-
sons eligible under federal standards, the AFDC cases have relied
on section 602(a)(IO). 29 In Townsend v. Swank,30 the Court explicitly
stated that the language in this statutory subsection overruled the
latitude created by HEW regulations which "imply that States may to
some extent vary eligibility requirements from federal standards."31
Despite the lack of an EANFC provision corresponding to
section 602(a)(10), which applies only to AFDC, a state may have to
adopt eligibility standards that conform to the statutory terms and the
intent of the federal EANFC program. Section 602(a)(10) was cited
by the Supreme Court in Townsend because it specifies a condition
that a state plan must satisfy if it is to be approved by the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare. 32 However, although decisions in
King and subsequent AFDC eligibility cases purport to rely on section
602(a)(10), they are actually based instead on a consideration of
policy expressed in this part of the Social Security Act. 33 The key
holding of these cases is that federal AFDC eligibility criteria are
mandatory on the states. By its terms, section 602(a)(10) does not
seem to justify this result. It merely requires that states act promptly
on all AFDC applications. Furthermore, Congress did not intend that
section 602(a)(10) be interpreted to compel states to adopt federal
standards. 34 Hence, it appears that the Court created a new require-
ment for state plans so that the statutory purposes of the federal
AFDC program would be given full effect, and cited section
602(a)(10) as a convenient provision incorporating this requirement.
Because the purposes of AFDC and EANFC are equally significant, a
± "[A]ll individuals wishing to make application for aid to families with dependent
children shall have opportunity to do so, and ... aid to families with dependent children
shall he furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals." 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10)
(1970).
30 404 U.S. 282 (1971).
31 Id. at 286.
32 "The Secretary shall approve any plan wbich fulfills the conditions specified in subsec-
tion (a) of this section .... " 42 U.S.C. § 602(b) (1970).
33 The purposes of the AFDC program are set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1970).
34 Indeed, HEW had no idea that such significance could be afforded to § 602 (a)(I0). In
attempting to justify its imposition of general limitations on state eligibility criteria, sometimes
called "Condition X," HEW never relied on this provision. Instead it focused on
§ 602(a)(4) and § 602(a)(5), although neither provision is relevant to the issue. Furthermore, on
two occasions Congress acquiesced in HEW's interpretations. From the congressional response
to the HEW action, it may be inferred that Congress did not believe that § 602(a)(10) provided a
firmer basis for limiting state discretion on this matter. See 76 YALE L.J. 1222 (1967).
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condition compelling states to adopt federal eligibility criteria should
be similarly read into the EANFC provisions.
35
Even if emergency assistance cases are beld to be distinguish-
able from King and its progeny, states would not be left free to
violate either the express wording or the legislative purposes of
EANFC. Under one HEW regulation, a state may restrict the scope
of a state-federal program such as EANFC "only where the Social
Security Act or its legislative history authorize more limited cover-
age."'36 It may impose eligibility conditions only if such conditions:
"assist the State in the efficient administration of its public assis-
tance programs, or further an independent State welfare policy,
and are not inconsistent with the provisions and purposes of the
Social Security Act."' 37 By this regulation, HEW has imposed on all
state-federal programs the limitations established in King as further
elaborated in Townsend.
38
One attempt to restrict the scope of an EANFC program may
be found in a New York Department of Social Services regulation
which excludes from EANFC participation all families left destitute
" Purnell v. Edelman, 365 F. Supp. 499 (N.D. Ill. 1973), modified, 495 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir.
1974), is in point:
The Courtfinds no merit in the defendants' argument that since they are not required
to adopt an emergency assistance program, they can operate it in virtually any way they
please. Federal law does not require them to adopt any welfare program at all. See
Townsend v. Swank. However, once the state has accepted federal money it is bound to
follow the federal law. The state may have some discretion in establishing what kinds of
destitution it seeks to avoid, but once it identifies a certain type of destitution it must act
in any way that avoids that destitution.
Id. at 500-01 (citation omitted). See Weiss, Emergency Assistance Under the AFDC Program,
4 CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW 120, 122-23 (1970), for another argument that acceptance of federal
EANFC money subjects a state's program to mandatory provisions like § 602(a)(10).
36 45 C.F.R. § 233.I0(a)(I)(ii)(A) (1974).
37 Id. § 233.10(a)(1)(ii)(B).
38 See note 28 supra. In 39 Fed. Reg. 26,912 (1975), which announced the amendment to
§ 233.10(a)(1), the Social and Rehabilitation Service gave the reason for such program restric-
tions: "The current state of the law as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court does not
permit a broader regulation." Before the amendment was promulgated, the regulation gave
states "substantial latitude" in "determining the coverage, nature and scope of their public
assistance programs." 45 C.F.R. § 233. 10(a)(1)(i) (1973). The only limitations on state flexibility
were that the state plan "not exclude individuals or groups on an arbitrary or unreasonable
basis, and must not result in inequitable treatment of individuals or groups in the light of the
provisions and purposes of the public assistance titles of the Social Security Act." 45 C.F.R.
§ 233.10(a)(1) (1973). The provision remains in effect today, strengthened by § 233.I0(a)(1)(i)(A)
and § 233.10(a)(I)(i)(B). Under the former regulation, a state was free to exclude a group only
when Congress did not specifically intend to grant assistance to such a group. An exclusion was
proper unless one of the stated purposes of the program was violated. For example, because of
explicit congressional concern that needy children not be denied emergency assistance because
of parental fault, a state would not have been allowed to deny aid tO all families that could have
averted crisis by proper planning. See notes 47-50 and accompanying text infra.
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by the theft of their public assistance benefit checks.39 A state court
struck down this regulation, relying in part on the supremacy
clause. 40 Although the regulation protects against recipient fraud,
an ostensibly reasonable objective, the court found the policy was
invalid because it inevitably denied aid to innocent persons requir-
ing such essentials as food, clothing, heat, and shelter. New York's
limitation on EANFC was not in accord with the structure of the
federal program, which provides that a state should select
emergency needs that it will attempt to meet regardless of their
cause-provided that a work requirement is not violate I 4' It was
improper for the New York Department of Social Services to single
out certain emergency situations for which aid could not be given;
the Department must find a different method to safeguard against
the possibility of fraud.42
States have also attempted to restrict the availability of EANFC
by imposing express or implied limitations upon the definition of
"emergency." For example, a number of states have narrowed the
scope of EANFC by declaring ineligible all families stricken by
some crisis which could have been avoided by advance planning
and careful budgeting.43 The states that have promulgated this
39 18 NYCRR 372.2(c) (Oct. 31, 1974) provides: "Emergency assistance shall not be
provided when destitution is due to loss, theft, or diversion of a grant already made."
40 Young v. Shuart, 67 Misc. 2d 689,324 N.Y.S.2d 583 (Sup. Ct. 1971), modified, 39 App.
Div. 2d 724, 331 N.Y.S.2d 962 (2d Dep't 1972). The court explained that the language of the
statute reflects the belief of the state legislature that the requirement of Rosado v. Wyman, 397
U.S. 397 (1970), applies to EANFC as well as AFDC. The legislature concluded that in order to
continue to receive federal money for emergency assistance, the state had to conform to all
relevant federal eligibility requirements; therefore, it incorporated the federal criteria into the
New York program. The court also noted that the exclusion of destitution due to loss or theft of
a grant already made was probably inconsistent with applicable federal requirements and thus
void under Rosado, Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970), and King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309
(1968).See also Ross v. Sipprell, 71 Misc. 2d 677, 336 N.Y.S.2d 861 (Sup. Ct. 1972),aff'd, 42 App.
Div. 2d 691,346 N.Y.S.2d 788 (4th Dep't 1973);Jonesv. Berman, 75 Misc. 2d 659, 348 N.Y.S.2d
670 (Sup. Ct. 1973), aff'd, 43 App. Div. 2d 942, 351 N.Y.S.2d 728 (2d Dep't 1974).
41 See note 23 supra.
42 For protection against fraud, the Department of Social Services could require an
expedited hearing of limited scope whenever there is reason to believe that an EANFC claimant
is attempting to defraud the department and receive double benefits. See notes 54-63 and
accompanying text infra. In addition, there are individual civil and criminal penalties
available if it is determined that a fraudulent claim has been made. See 18 NYCRR
§ 348.4 (May 31, 1974). See also N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 145 (McKinney Supp. 1974). Other states
have similar sanctions against welfare fraud. See, e.g., CAL. WEL.. & INST'NS §§ 11,482, 11,483
(West 1972); MAss. GFN. LAws ANN. ch. 117, § 23 (Supp. 1975).
43 See N.J.A.C. 10.82-12.11(c) (Supp. Aug. 15, 1973) and the cases interpreting this
provision so as to deny EANFC to certain AFDC recipients, Boyd v. Department of Institutions
& Agencies, 126 N.J. Super. 273, 314 A.2d 79 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 65 N.J. 281, 321 A.2d 242
(1974), and to certain other recipients of categorical assistance, King v. New Jersey Dep't of
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restriction intend that their limited resources be used to aid only
those people whose needs were not caused by their own fault.4
4
Although this motivation may be rational, the eligibility restriction
is nevertheless impermissible if not authorized by the Social Se-
curity Act.
Federal statutory and regulatory provisions do not define the
term "emergency." However, the absence of an express federal
definition does not allow a state to define the term in any way it
deems appropriate.4 5 In the absence of a congressional definition,
one can assume that Congress intended "emergency" to have its
ordinary meaning without any notion of fault.46 Thus, the exclu-
Institutions & Agencies, 124 N.J. Super. 518,308 A.2d 32 (App. Div. 1973). In Boyd, the court
stated:
We do not read the federal statute as attempting an exclusive definition of the term
"emergency" for all situations under which emergency assistance may be provided.
Rather we think the New Jersey regulation refines the term according to its general
common sense understanding.
126 N.J. Super. at 275-76, 314 A.2d at 80.
44 Another related consideration is a state's desire to avoid granting duplicate assistance. A
grant of regular public assistance is presumed sufficient to meet all of a recipient's needs.
Therefore, a person who uses his regular benefits properly should not require any additional
assistance. Duplication occurs whenever a recipient of regular public assistance, who has spent
his entire monthly grantbefore the end of the month, receives emergency assistance to provide
needed clothing or fuel. By administrative regulation, Oregon prohibits such duplicate assis-
tance: "Payments shall not be made to meet emergent need when the need arose solely because
of the family's failure to meet obligations already provided for in Public Assistance grants."
OREGON PWD RuLES AND REGULATIONS § 5.635(1) (Transmittal Letter No. 47, May 15, 1974).
Other states, such as New York and New Jersey, achieve the same result through judicial
interpretation of the state's EANFC program requirements. See note 50 infra.
45 Although the Social Security Act contains no express definition of "parent," the
Supreme Court, in King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), invalidated a Louisiana welfare
department regulation which defined a "child's parent" to include a man who was neither the
natural nor the adoptive father of the child, and thus had no statutory duty to support the child.
Id. at 327-33. See 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(a) (1974). The Court held the regulation void because it
effectively denied aid to eligible needy children. Neither the Social Security Act nor its
legislative history authorized the exclusion of children living in a home in which their mother
cohabited with a man who did not have a sufficient support obligation.
In examining the validity of a state's exclusion of all unborn children, the Supreme Court
utilized the same test: "The State must provide benefits to all individuals who meet the federal
definition of 'dependent child' and who are 'needy' under state standards, unless they are
excluded or aid is made optional by another provision of the Act." Burns v. Alcala, 95 S. Ct.
1180,1183 (1975). Because there was no express federal definition, the Court looked first to the
ordinary meaning of the word "child," and concluded that it applied only to children who had
been born, although some dictionary definitions included unborn children. Then, after
considering the purpose of the Social Security Act and certain specific language in the Act (the
words "child" and "children" were used in a context where they could refer only to horn
children), the Court upheld the state's policy of exclusion of the unborn. Id. at 1184-86.
46 Burns v. Alcala, 95 S. Ct. 1180, 1184 (1975); Banks v. Chicago Grain Trimmers Ass'n,
390 U.S. 459,465 (1968); Minorv. Mechanics Bank ofAlexandria, 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 46,64 (1828).
Dictionary definitions of "emergency" stress the need for immediate action and typically
emphasize unforeseeability, but make no reference to fault. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNA-
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sion from eligibility of those who fail to plan to avert a disaster is
unauthorized unless such a restrictive interpretation of the word
"emergency" can be found either in other statutory language or in
the applicable legislative history.
47
In the EANFC provisions of the Social Security Act, the only
reference to fault as a factor concerning eligibility appears in the
dearly stated work penalty clause. 48 Since the Act specifies this
single fault ground for ineligibility, one may infer that Congress
was not concerned with other types of fault, such as failing to plan
adequately for the possibility of future adversity. Moreover, the
legislative history of the Social Security Act manifests a concern for
providing for children in need, regardless of parental fault.49
Accordingly, a state is not free to conserve its fiscal resources by
categorically denying emergency assistance to all unsophisticated
budgeters. 50 The state has other means to ensure a proper utiliza-
TIONAL DICTIONARY 741 (3d ed. 1961) defines emergency as "an unforeseen combination of
circumstances or the resulting state that calls for immediate action." The RANDOM HOUSE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 467 (1967) defines emergency as "a sudden, urgent,
usually unforeseen occurrence or occasion requiring immediate action."
47 See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
48 See note 16 and accompanying textsupra. See also Bryant v. Lavine, 79 Misc. 2d 425,359
N.Y.S.2d 492 (Sup. Ct. 1974), in which the court held that the only eligibility criteria for
emergency assistance were that a child be needy and without resources, that assistance be
necessary to avoid destitution, and that such destitution not result from a violation of the work
requirement.
4' The reason for instituting EANFC was to improve the AFDC program's care and
protection of children. The conference report on the bill stated that emergency assistance
should be available even when an alcoholic leaves children without food, because the children
are put in a position of dire need. See note 3 supra. Only after a child's needs have been met
should the welfare officials concern themselves with parental fault. See notes 50-51 infra.
Considering this congressional concern, the severe work penalty provision of the EANFC
program is an obvious anomaly.
50 Emergency aid must be granted where children are faced with destitution, even if it
constitutes duplicate assistance. Preston v. Barbaro, 61 Misc. 2d 327,305 N.Y.S.2d 627 (Sup. Ct.
1969),affd on other grounds, 34 App. Div. 2d 809,311 N.Y.S.2d 997 (2d Dep't 1970); see also note
5 supra. An Illinois court reached the same conclusion in a case dealing with a clothing
allowance. Relying on state statutory grounds, the court decided that the EANFC grant,
although constituting a duplicate grant, could not be recouped from subsequent AFDC
payments. Heinrich v. Illinois Dep't of Pub. Aid, 129 Ill. App. 2d 65, 262 N.E.2d 785 (1970).
Another New York case, Domine v. Schreck, 74 Misc. 2d 1074, 347 N.Y.S.2d 293 (Sup. Ct.
1973), modified, 44 App. Div. 2d 98, 353 N.Y.S.2d 821 (3d Dep't 1974), arrived at a slightly
different solution. The court authorized emergency assistance only for the children in a family,
pending an investigation of the issue of grant duplication. Id. at 100-101, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 824.
But cf., Boyd v. Department of Institutions & Agencies, 126 N.J. Super. 273, 275-76, 314 A.2d
79,82-83 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 65 N.J. 281, 32 A.2d 242 (1974); King v. NewJersey Dep't of
Institutions & Agencies, 124 NJ. Super. 518, 308 A.2d 32 (App. Div. 1973).
The policy against duplication of assistance has also been a significant factor when EANFC
funds were requested to replace furniture that was worn out through normal use. In Baumes v.
Lavine, 44 App. Div. 2d 336, 355 N.Y.S.2d 477 (3d Dep't 1974), a denial of such a request was
affirmed because EANFC
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tion of its public assistance expenditures. 51 It has the power to
choose what exigent needs will be met. But once these needs have
been identified, the state is required to provide EANFC benefits to
all such necessitous families if there is no violation of the work
requirement.
III
REVIEW OF ADVERSE DETERMINATIONS
When a family's application for emergency assistance is de-
nied, the applicant must be afforded a means of challenging that
determination. Although the family has recourse to a fair hear-
was enacted to apply to sudden and unexplained emergency events and not to remedy
the anticipated demands created as the result of everyday life. It was not designed to
replace furniture merely worn by normal use... but where emergency or catastrophe
suddenly affects the family or individuals involved. To so hold would violate the
concept of semimonthly flat grants to welfare recipients and inundate the Department
of Social Services with requests for additional assistance to meet the everyday needs for
which the vast population, also on fixed incomes, have learned to budget and expect.
Id. at 336-37, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 478 (citations omitted). The court based its decision not only on
grant duplication, but also on unforeseen destitution; hence, the privation did not arise from an
emergency. Despite its name, however, emergency assistance is not confined to unforeseen
exigendes. Rather, it encompasses all forms of destitution requiring immediate action. The
statutory language focuses on the extent of need with no reference to foresee-
ability. See note 4 supra. Furthermore, the legislative history indicates a congressional desire to
meet immediate needs. For example, during the course of debate on the 1968 Amendments to
the Social Security Act, Representative Farbstein (New York) said of EANFC:
I view with-particular enthusiasm the provision establishing an emergency assistance
program for dependent children and their families .... Program coverage includes not
only cash payments, but payments to purchase items needed immediately by the family
such as living accommodations, medical care, and a variety of related services. I believe
we should study the results of this program carefully in the year ahead to see if
additional benefits and legislative authority are needed to effectively carry out this
emergency assistance program.
113 CONG. REC. 23131 (1967). When a cbild is in urgent need of a bed either because his firstbed
has become worn, lost in a fire, or because he has grown too old to be sleeping with siblings of the
opposite sex, a state which recoguizes household furnishings in its EANFC program must
provide emergency aid. See Hatfield v. Lavine, 42 App. Div. 2d 855,346 N.Y.S.2d 845 (2d Dep't
1973); Woods v. Lavine, 76 Misc. 2d 677, 351 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. C. 1973); Nicholson v.
Schreck, 75 Misc. 2d 676, 348 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
51 Inefficient use of public assistance moneys could be minimized if local departments of
social services provided classes in money management to families on public assistance or those
near the poverty line. When departmental officials have reason to believe that public assistance
benefits are not being used in the best interests of a family's children, they should provide some
form of money management counseling. See 42 U.S.C. § 605 (1970). The possibility of an
emergency arising from mismanagement of public assistance benefits might also be reduced by
allowing the state to make payments in kind for such needs as rent and heat whenever a
recipient has demonstrated an inability to manage his money efficiently. In extreme instances of
parental abuse of public assistance funds, the state could institute neglect proceedings against
the parents, and a guardian could be appointed to protect the children's interests. See id.
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ing,52 the regular fair hearing procedure may be inadequate for
handling the special problems that the emergency assistance pro-
gram was designed to solve. The major shortcoming of the normal
fair hearing process is delay. Generally, a fair hearing cannot be
obtained until two or three weeks after it has been requested.
Moreover, the state welfare department need not render its fair
hearing decision until ninety days after the hearing has been
requested. 53 Throughout this period, the EANFC applicant is
without the assistance for which he has claimed an urgent need.
The slowness of the fair hearing process creates two difficulties
when the process is applied to cases under the emergency assis-
tance program. First, it may violate federal requirements that
emergency assistance be provided "forthwith" and that aid be
furnished to "avoid destitution. ' 54 Once an eligible individual is
denied EANFC by a local department, 55 he will not receive any
benefits until after a fair hearing decision has been rendered,
perhaps several months following the initial application. If the
initial need were urgent, the delay might result in the payment of
benefits only long after the applicant has become destitute.
Second, a delay of ninety days between the making of an
EANFC application and the rendering of the fair hearing decision
52 An opportunity for a fair hearing must be afforded to any claimant for public assistance
in any part of the AFDC program. See 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(1) (1974). See also Murray v. State
Dep't of Social Serv., 260 Md. 323, 272 A.2d 16 (1971).
53 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(16) (1974). Prior to the 1973 amendment, the limitwas 60 days. 45
C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(1 1) (1972). Regulations in some states may still adhere to the former 60-day
rule, see, e.g., N.J.A.C. 10:81-24.28 (1969), but it is likely that these states will soon take
advantage of the amendment to the federal regulation. New York has already changed its limit
from 60 to 90 days. See 18 NYCRR 358.18(a) (Nov. 30, 1974).
54 45 C.F.R. § 233.120(a)(5), (b)(1)(iii) (1974); 42 U.S.C. § 606(e) (1970). See notes 11-14
and accompanying text supra.
55 The tendency of welfare departments to deny benefits to some people eligible for
them has been widely recognized. Comment, Due Process and the Right to a Prior Hearing in
Welfare Cases, 37 FoRDHAm L. REv. 604, 610-11 (1969), is cited as illustrative of the "welfare
bureaucracy's difficulties in reaching correct decisions on eligibility." Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 264 n.12 (1970). In this article, the author notes:
[I]ntense public and political pressures to "cut costs" have had the pernicious effect
of forcing welfare departments to be both oversensitive to keeping persons off
relief rolls and in not allowing the agencies to improve their internal administrative
practices.
37 FORDHAM L. REv. 604, 610-11 (1969).
Goldberg and the Fordham Law Review article emphasize the improper termination of
aid. However, applicants for public assistance face identical difficulties. "Eligibility determi-
nations, both at the time of intake or [sic] at the time of redetermination, often result in the
denial of public assistance to eligible persons and applicants," Comment, Eligibility Determina-
tions in Public Assistance: Selected Problems and Proposals for Reform in Pennsylvania, 115 U. PA.
L. RFv. 1307, 1312 (1967).
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may constitute a denial of the applicant's due process right to a
prompt adjudication of his claim. The Supreme Court, in Goldberg
v. Kelly, 56 held that due process considerations apply to the deter-
mination of public assistance benefits. In fact, due process man-
dates that an applicant for public assistance be given an opportu-
nity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful man-
ner."57 He must be able to contest the local department denial
before he becomes effectively bound by that decision. Since an
applicant for emergency assistance will be rendered destitute
unless he receives benefits shortly after filing his application, a
hearing on an emergency assistance claim must produce a decision
within a short time if it is to be meaningful. An eligible applicant
would otherwise be placed in economic jeopardy pending the
decision on his claim.
58
56 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Goldberg emphasized that a welfare recipient's survival de-
pends upon his continued receipt of welfare benefits. The Supreme Court said: "The
extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient is influenced by the
extent to which he may be 'condemned to suffer grievous loss'...." Id. at 262-63, quoting
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). An applicant and a recipient may each be rendered destitute by the denial of
benefits. Therefore, consideration of the urgency of need dictates that due process be
afforded to an EANFC applicant as it is to an AFDC recipient, at least where the applicant
needs public assistance in order to survive.
Furthermore, it can be argued that the existence of a state statute or regulation
authorizing emergency assistance gives an EANFC applicant an interest and claim to which
due process requirements apply. In Goldberg, the Court noted that AFDC benefits "are a
matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them." Id. at 262. The Court
supported this argument by citing cases concerning withdrawal of other forms of public
benefits to establish the need for evidentiary hearings prior to the termination of welfare
benefits. Id. at 262-63. Although it did not discuss the need for a prompt evidentiary hearing
upon the denial of an applicant's daim for public assistance, it did cite several cases which
held that due process must be afforded applicants for certain public benefits. Id. at 262-63
n.9. In one of these cases, Goldsmith v. Board of Tak Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926), a
certified public accountant sought the right to practice before the Board of Tax Appeals.
Because his application indicated that he was within the class of those entitled by the rules of
the Board to practice before it, the Court stated, in dictum, that the accountant could not be
denied admittance upon charges of unfitness until "after fair investigation, with such a
notice, hearing and opportunity to answer ... as would constitute due process." Id. at 123.
Because Goldberg emphasized the similarity of various types of public entitlements, it appears
that on the basis of such cases as Goldsmith an applicant for EANFC has an interest to be
protected by due process.
57 Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). In Armstrong, an adoption proceed-
ing decree was set aside for reconsideration because the natural father had not received
notice until after the burden of proof had been shifted by the findings at the initial adoption
proceeding. Petitioner Armstrong's rights had been effectively throttled by the initial hearing
because of the difficulty in meeting the resulting burden of proof. Normal fair hearing
procedure at the subsequent hearing was, therefore, held to be insufficient to satisfy the
demands of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
58 For instance, an applicant who was seeking to forestall utility termination would lose
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It is virtually certain that any procedure to expedite the fair
hearing process will entail additional expense and inconvenience
for state governments. Nevertheless, because the applicant's in-
terest in avoiding destitution so outweighs the governmental in-
terests involved, some type of prompt review must be provided.59
The particular circumstances confronting those applying for
emergency assistance has led a number of courts to conclude that
there is no need to exhaust administrative remedies where grave
harm would result from delay in the determination of initial
entitlement. Applicants have therefore been granted a right to im-
mediate judicial review of denials by local welfare departments. 60
Other courts, believing that departmental hearings are more
appropriate for reviewing departmental decisions, have directed
welfare departments to grant a fair hearing with the instruction
that "the decision thereon should not be unduly delayed."' 61 Such
an expedited review process has many advantages over immediate
resort to the courts. The relatively informal setting of the hearings
is more conducive to rapid resolution of the factual questions that
often arise in EANFC claims. 62 The informality also makes de-
utility service if his claim for financial assistance were not approved with sufficient speed.
The applicant would then be forced to live without heat or electricity until after the decision
on his claim had been rendered.
59 Against the justified desire to protect public funds must be weighed the indi-
vidual's overpowering need in this unique situation not to be wrongfully deprived
of assistance .... While the problem of additional expense must be kept in mind, it
does not justify denying a hearing meeting the ordinary standards of due process.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970), quoting Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 901
(1968).
60 See, e.g., Borders v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Serv., 34 App. Div. 2d 805, 311
N.Y.S.2d 746 (2d Dep't 1970) (food); Edge v. Sugarman, 66 Misc. 2d 713, 321 N.Y.S.2d 28
(Sup. Ct. 1971) (eviction); Summers v. Wyman, 64 Misc. 2d 67, 314 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sup. Ct.
1970) (utilities).
61 Anderson v. Goldberg (Sup. Ct. Feb. 1, 1971), in 165 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 2, 1971, at 19,
col. 2. See Randle v. Weaver, [1972-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH Pov. L. REP. 18,895 (E.D.
Il1. 1974). Randle required Illinois welfare agencies to replace missing categorical assistance
checks within either two weeks or one month, depending on whether the recipient had
previously made a fraudulent claim for replacement. It also ordered that a recipient be
given the opportunity to have a prompt hearing and decision on the question of whether he
had ever made such a fraudulent claim.
62 In Lucas v. Chapman, 430 F.2d 945, 948 (5th Cir. 1970), the court of appeals held
that the "localized, less formalized, less adversary atmosphere" of the board of education is
to be preferred to a courtroom for resolving problems concerning teacher rehiring. Similar
considerations should apply in challenges of EANFC denials. A hearing officer has more
freedom than a judge to interrupt the flow of testimony and question either party concern-
ing an unclear point which has been raised. In this way, he can quickly reach a decision on a
subissue, whereas a judge might have to wait until after the end of a trial to resolve such a
matter. In addition, since administrative proceedings are not rigidly bound by rules of
evidence, a claimant enjoys a better opportunity to present all of the evidence in his favor.
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partmental hearings less burdensome for applicants and the state
social services departments; the applicant need not prepare com-
plicated legal papers, and the state is spared the greater expense
and investment of personnel associated with a court proceeding.
An applicant's due process rights might best be satisfied by grant-
ing him a fair hearing within a week of his EANFC denial, and by




Although EANFC is seven years old, it is still in its early stages
of development. Outside of New York State, case law on the
program is virtually nonexistent. As a result, many state EANFC
programs, operated beyond the boundaries of their allowable dis-
cretion in restricting eligibility, remain virtually unchallenged. At a
time when increasing numbers of people are pushed toward des-
titution by inflation, recession, and high unemployment, it is
hoped that that EANFC program will be properly utilized to respond
to the emergency needs of our nation's poor.
Lawrence Gardella
Factual issues are critical in emergency assistance cases. The key issue is whether the
applicant is truly destitute, or whether there are resources available to a child or parent to
meet the stated need. It is also important to determine whether the applicant has refused
work or work training and whether the applicant has made any fraudulent statements.
" The hearing would focus on whether sufficient resources were available to meet the
family's immediate needs. For a discussion of the type of hearing mandated by due process
considerations, see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266-71 (1970). See also Comment, The
Constitutional Minimum for the Termination of Welfare Benefits: The Need for and Requirements of a
Prior Hearing, 68 MIcH. L. REV. 112 (1969).
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